1 Introduction
Although decision making regarding investments in information systems is
a quite new research theme in Information Systems literature, sciences
like Economy, Mathematics, Psychology and Sociology have been studying
decision making processes for quite some time. Until the seventies,
decision making was mainly concerned with how decisions ideally should
be made (Koopman and Pool, 1992). This resulted in decision making
models based mainly on economic calculations like return-on-investment
(ROI), pay-back-period (PBP) and net-present-value (NPV). Later on, more
attention was paid to how decisions actually are made in organizations,
introducing social sciences to decision making research
(Koopman and Pool, 1992).
The way decisions are made in practice appeared to be quite different
from how one thought they ought be made (Beach, 1990).
Nowadays, numerous sciences study decision making processes, each in
their own way. As it is not usual to cross the borders of one’s own
discipline, decision making literature can be characterised by a chaotic
diversity of definitions and interpretations of a variety of terms.
Although there is a substantial overlap in terms and definitions,
problems solved in one discipline are often redefined years later in
another discipline with its own perspective, vision and interpretation,
without any knowledge of the experiences of other disciplines. A short
overview of the diversity of scientific disciplines studying decision
making, is illustrated in table 1.
|
Objective of
study |
Descriptive |
Prescriptive |
|
Individual |
Psychology |
Decision making theory |
|
|
Marketing |
Micro-economics |
|
|
Psychiatry |
Operational
Research |
|
|
Literature
|
Logic |
|
Group level |
Social psychology |
Game theory |
|
|
Organizational
behaviour |
Organizational
behaviour |
|
|
Anthropology |
Clinical
psychology |
|
|
Sociology
|
Economics |
|
Organization |
Organizational
theory |
Planning |
|
|
Sociology |
Cybernetics |
|
|
Politics
|
Economics |
|
Community |
Sociology |
Philosophy |
|
|
Anthropology |
Politics |
|
|
Macro economics |
|
Table 1: Scientific disciplines
studying decision making (Koopman and Pool, 1992)
In this article, behavioural theory is
described regarding individual and group decision making,
as being, ‘natural’ starting points. Although evaluation of information
systems will normally be a group activity, the group consists of
individuals that will also make many, often implicit, individual
decisions. After the introduction to individual and group decision
making, the quality characteristics of decision making will be
described. Subsequently, the consequences regarding decision making
methods will be described. A number of suggestions will be stated to
improve decision making in practice. It is superfluous to say that this
article can only be an introduction to the topic at hand.
This article is a joint effort of Delft
University of Technology and the Free University of Amsterdam. The first
employs a research programme on the evaluation of IT, and the second, on
decision making in general.
2 Individuals and decision making
Individuals are constantly ‘bombarded’ by
sensory stimulation. These are noises, sights, smells, tastes and
tactile sensations, yet somehow manage to process all this information
to some extent. This process is known as perception. Perception
is defined as the experience people have as the immediate result of
sensory inputs (Harrison, 1987, p. 232). Perception is a system of
selection, and of organization of sensations to provide a
meaningful entity. Selection, because some input is received and
processed, and some is not. Organization, because the information
received must be ordered and categorised in order to find meaning for
the inputs.
Before a decision can be made, the
problem must first be perceived (information must be classified
relevant or irrelevant). This process is referred to as framing (Beach,
1990; Huizenga, 1994). Beach discerns three distinct but related
images that decision makers use for framing (Beach, 1990). Together
they form the cognitive structure of the decision maker. They are
(Beach, 1990):
·
The value image, consisting of the decision
maker’s principles, like: values, moral standards, beliefs, ethics,
etcetera.
·
The trajectory image, consisting of the decision
maker’s agenda for the future (both personal and for the organization),
the decision maker’s objectives and time-lines. Examples are: getting a
particular job (concrete), or, being happy (abstract).
·
The strategic image, consisting of the decision
maker’s plans to accomplish the particular objectives, as well as the
decision maker’s projections of the effects of implementing the plans in
terms of the chances of successfully attaining the goals.
When things are found to be going
smoothly within a framed context, the decision maker need only monitor
the situation in order to detect any difficulties that may arise.
However if difficulties arise, the decision maker must intervene.
Intervention consists of either doing what has worked before in a
similar context, referred to as the use of policies, or of
adopting new goals or plans for the images, thereby instigating new
behaviour to deal with the difficulties and, perhaps, dropping existing
goals or plans from the images if they are the source of the
difficulties (Beach, 1990).
There are many influences that distort
the process of forming impressions. Some important ones are (Harrison,
1987, p. 237):
·
Stereotyping,
a form of categorisation where the conception of relationships takes too
little account of reality (oversimplification).
·
The Halo effect, where the conception of a
particular fact is based on a more general impression (for instance, a
badly-groomed person working at a university is expected to be an
excellent researcher).
·
Projection,
the tendency to attribute your personal characteristics to other people.
Regardless of which model is used by the
decision maker in selecting the best alternative, some characteristics
of the decision maker and of the decision task itself,
influence the decision (Beach, 1990). With regard to the decision task,
the following characteristics are pertinent (Beach, 1990):
·
Unfamiliarity.
The degree to which the decision task is foreign to the decision maker.
·
Ambiguity.
The degree to which the decision task is unclear to the decision maker.
·
Complexity.
The number of different components of the decision task: the number of
alternatives to be considered, the amount of relative information to be
considered, and the number of criteria applied.
·
Instability.
The degree to which objectives, criteria, and constraints change during
decision making.
·
Reversibility.
The degree to which the choice can be reversed if necessary.
·
Significance.
The importance of the decision to the decision maker and the
organization.
·
Accountability.
The degree to which the decision maker is accountable for the
consequences of the decision.
·
Time and/or money
constraints. The
limitations on time and money during the decision making process.
In addition, the following
characteristics of the decision maker are pertinent (Beach, 1990):
·
Knowledge.
The amount of relevant knowledge at hand to make the decision.
·
Ability.
The degree of intelligence and competence possessed by the decision
maker.
·
Motivation.
The desire of the decision maker to excel and succeed.
The number of problems at hand might lead
to many negative impressions of decision makers. Ciborra states that
people are mislead by frames: “...they contain poor representations of
reality, precluding attention to the details of the actual situation at
hand”, and: “They are oversimplified schemata, ruthlessly held and
easily retrieved, that tend to ingrain mind and action, so that
behaviour appears to be ‘programmed’ sometimes in an unwished-for
manner...” (Ciborra, 1993, p. 27). Another example is given by
Antonides: “Normative models prescribe how information processing has to
proceed to select the most preferred alternative.” “In practice,
however, people deviate considerably from the optimal way of information
processing.” “... It appears that the channel capacity of communication
sets a natural limit on the processing of uni-dimensional information”
(Antonides, 1991, p. 131).
When decision
makers are confronted with their incomplete decisions, they still have
numerous ‘bolstering tactics’ to retain a positive perception of their
behaviour (Janis and Mann, 1977). These tactics are: exaggerating
favourable consequences, minimising unfavourable consequences, denying
aversive feelings, exaggerating the remoteness of the action, minimising
social surveillance, and minimising personal responsibility.
Given the cognitive limitations of
decision makers, the following statements apply (Harrison, 1977, p.
128):
·
An optimal decision at one point in time, is generally
suboptimal in subsequent times. Since nobody can foresee the future, it
is useless to go to extreme lengths to search for the optimal
solution. It is complex enough to decide how far to go.
·
Normally, there are an enormous amount of possible
alternatives, criteria, consequences, etcetera. It is simply impossible
to obtain all information.
·
Often much information will be outside the control of
the decision maker.
Individuals respond by employing rather
simple strategies, even in the presence of complex problems (Harrison,
1977, p. 11; Janis and Mann, 1977, p. 22). Further, decision making
behaviour is adaptive: individuals start with a tentative solution,
search for information, modify the initial solution, and continue until
there is a balance between expected and realised results (Harrison,
1987, p. 10). An example of such a model is the conflict-theory model of
Janis and Mann (1977, p. 70).

Figure 1: A conflict-theory model of
decision making applicable to all consequential decisions (Janis and
Mann, 1977, p. 70)
Summarised, due to many cognitive
limitations individual decision makers tend to reflect a number of
characteristics. Harrison states the following overview (Harrison, 1987,
p. 10):
·
Human subjects tend to overestimate low probabilities of
events and underestimate high probabilities.
·
Individuals appear to be insensitive to the sample size
of their observations.
·
Individuals adjust their first approximations to an
estimate on the basis of additional evidence.
·
Individuals tend to be overconfident of their ability to
estimate the probability of an uncertain event.
·
Individuals tend to overestimate the probability of
events that actually occur, as well as the extent to which they or
others would have been able to predict past events.
·
Human subjects reveal a tendency to compare pairs of
alternatives rather than a whole list.
·
Individuals tend to minimise reliance on explicit
trade-offs or other numerical computations.
·
Individuals exhibit choices that are sometimes
inconsistent and intransitive.
·
On balance, human subjects often
behave in ways that dispel the notion that they are proper decision
theorists with well defined objective functions.
3 Groups and decision making
Group decision making is not simply an
extension of individual decision making. When people interact in a group
a new entity is created with its own complexity and dynamics, also
influencing the behaviour and perception of the group members. Groups
are defined as: “a number of persons who communicate with one another
often over a span of time, and who are few enough so that each person is
able to communicate with all the others, not at second-hand, through
other people, but face to face” (Homans, 1950, p. 1).
Groups as decision makers have both
strengths and weaknesses. The strengths of groups are a greater sum of
knowledge and information, resulting in a greater sum of approaches to a
problem. Besides that, participation in decision making increases
general acceptance of the final choice, whereas direct participation in
the communication leads to a better comprehension of the decision
(Harrison, 1977, p. 273).
Examples of weaknesses are (Harrison,
1977, p. 274):
·
Social pressure.
The desire to be accepted as a group member tends to silence
disagreement and favour consensus.
·
Acceptance of solutions.
The first solution that appears to receive strong support from the
majority of the members or even from a vocal minority, tends to be
accepted. Solutions of higher quality introduced after this first
solution has been accepted have little chance of receiving serious
consideration.
·
Individual domination.
In most leaderless groups a dominant individual emerges and exerts more
than his, or her, share of influence on the decision. Even a leader who
is appointed by the group tends to exert a major influence on the
selection of a preferred alternative.
·
Winning the decision.
The appearance of several alternatives often causes the members to
support a particular position. These preferences often take precedence
over finding the best solution and the result is a compromise decision
of lower quality.
·
Reduction of
responsibility. In a
group situation the sense of personal responsibility for the decision is
reduced to the extent that the decision is shared (Harrison, 1977, p.
298).
There can be many reasons why group
decision making goes wrong. They all relate to conflicting objectives of
the members: twist for resources, different value systems, and
interdependency.
Presence of conflicts can be recognised
by signals as interference, or the lack of consideration shown,
overstatement of issues, withholding of information, annoyed reactions
and distrust (Corwin, 1969, p. 507-520).
Another problem with group decision
making is groupthink: a collective pattern of defensive avoidance
(Janis and Mann, 1977). The eight symptoms of groupthink are:
·
An illusion of invulnerability, shared by most or all of
the members, which creates excessive optimism and encourages taking
extreme risks.
·
Collective efforts to rationalise in order to discount
warnings which might lead the members to reconsider their assumptions
before they recommit themselves to their past policy decisions.
·
An unquestioned belief in the group’s inherent morality,
inclining the members to ignore the ethical or moral consequences of
their decisions.
·
Stereotyped views of rivals and enemies as too evil to
warrant genuine attempts to negotiate, or as too weak or stupid to
counter whatever risky attempts are made to defeat their purposes.
·
Direct pressure on any member who expresses strong
arguments against any of the group’s stereotypes, illusions, or
commitments, making clear that such dissent is contrary to what is
expected of all loyal members.
·
Self-censorship of deviations from the apparent group
consensus, reflecting each member’s inclination to minimise to himself,
or herself, the importance of doubts and counter-arguments.
·
A shared illusion of unanimity. partly
resulting from this self-censorship and augmented by the false
assumption that silence implies consent.
·
The emergence of self-appointed mindguards: members who
protect the group from adverse information that might shatter their
complacency about the effectiveness and morality of their decisions.
Conditions that increase the chances of
groupthink are: high cohesiveness, insulation of the group, lack of
methodical procedures for search and appraisal, directive leadership and
high stress with a low degree of hope for finding a better solution than
the one favoured by the leader or other influential persons (Janis and
Mann, 1977, p. 132).
As IT evaluation requires a lot of
knowledge of the entire organization, it is usually performed in a group
process. A composite approach that encourages the strengths and
weaknesses of both individual and group decision making seems
appropriate. Harrison states the following suggestions (Harrison, 1977,
p. 300):
·
In setting objectives, groups may be selectively
superior to individuals simply because more knowledge is available from
the combined membership.
·
In the search for alternatives, many individual efforts,
either by members of the group or their supporting staff, are necessary
to ensure a broad search in the areas that apply.
·
In evaluating the alternatives revealed mainly by
individual efforts, the collective judgement of the group, with its
broader range of critical viewpoints, has a definite potential to be
superior.
·
The moment of choice in group decision making joins
individuals who desire risk and those who wish to avoid it. The actual
choice, therefore, may involve less a risk than one made by an
individual, depending upon the individual’s willingness to accept
uncertainty. In any event the group decision is more likely to be
generally accepted as a result of the participation of those who will be
affected by its consequences.
·
A decision made by an individual or a group must be
implemented by individual managers who are personally responsible for
the outcome of their actions. It is good to recall that it is not
practical to hold a group responsible for its choice. Therefore,
responsibility falls on the individual manager.
·
Follow-up and control procedures must also be carried
out by the individual managers at the point of implementation. Of
course, a decision making group can, and perhaps should, keep an eye on
such procedures. Still, the direct responsibility to ensure an outcome
that will meet the original objective lies with the individual manager.
The scope of decision making does not
stop at the level of a group. After all, groups are part of an
organization, where, numerous groups tend to accomplish their
objectives. Consequently, decision making does not stop at the level of
the organization, because organizations are related to each other in
society, etcetera
4 Quality characteristics of decision making
Janis and Mann extracted seven important
criteria to determine whether a decision making process is of high
quality (Janis and Mann, 1977, p. 11). These criteria are stated in
table 2.
|
A decision making
process is of good quality when the decision maker: |
|
-
thoroughly canvasses a wide range of
alternative courses of action |
|
-
surveys the full range of objectives to be
fulfilled and the values implicated by the choice |
|
-
carefully weighs whatever he knows about the costs and risks of
negative consequences, as well as the positive consequences, that
could flow from each alternative |
|
-
intensively searches for new information relevant to further
evaluation of the alternatives |
|
-
correctly assimilates and takes account of any new information or
expert judgement to which he is exposed, even when the information
or judgement does not support the course of action he initially
prefers |
|
-
re-examines the positive and negative consequences of all known
alternatives, including those originally regarded as unacceptable,
before making a final choice |
|
-
makes
detailed provisions for implementing or executing the chosen
course of action, with special attention to contingency plans that
might be required if various known risks were to materialise |
Table 2: Quality characteristics of
a decision making process (Janis and Mann, 1977, p. 11)
The concept of quality in the above
enumeration is closely related to the concept of rationality.
Simon defines the concept of bounded rationality as follows (Simon,
1979, p. 501):
·
Look at satisfactory choices in stead of optimal ones.
·
Replace abstract, global goals with tangible subgoals,
whose achievement can be observed and measured.
·
Divide up the decision making task among many
specialists, co-ordinating their work by means of a structure of
communications and authority relations.
The concept of rationality can refer to
many characteristics of the decision making process. It can refer to the
search for alternatives, the search criteria, the weighing of
alternatives, etcetera. Harrison is one of the very few who defines the
concept of rationality in more detail (Harrison, 1977, p. 105). He
points at the difference between rational decisions and the attitude of
decision makers towards the decision making process. Harrison defines
rational decisions: “all that is necessary to make a choice a rational
one is that an objective exists and that the decision maker perceives
and selects some alternative that promises to meet the objective”
(Harrison, 1977, p. 107). This implies that it can indeed be rational to
perceive an emotional objective. In contradiction to the situation where
an emotion obstructs a rational weighing of the consequences. “In
managerial decision making, rationality and emotionality are not the
opposite ends of the spectrum” (Harrison, 1987, p. 108). Taylor
emphasises to train decision makers in order to better cope with
cognitive strain and expand the decision making performance (Taylor,
1975, p. 419).
5 Decision supporting methods
Many methods and techniques have been
proposed to assist in the evaluation of information systems. A number of
overviews have been published (Swinkels and Irsel, 1992; Farbey et al.,
1992; Willcocks, 1992; Blackler and Brown, 1988; Powell, 1992; Berghout
and Renkema, 1994). Berghout and Renkema (1994) refer to over sixty
methods.
Research showed that more mechanical methods are easier to apply and
therefore might lead to better results (Klompé and Berghout, 1995).
However, the disadvantage of these methods is that decision makers in
spite of slightly better results, are less confident of their decision
and criticise the applied method more. Applying more mechanical methods
means that (dis-)advantages of alternatives have to be expressed in
figures after which the ranking is produced applying some algorithm
(some method of weighing and scoring). Not only it is hard to express
all (dis-)advantages in figures, many decision makers experience this
unauthorised addition of distinct units of measure as unpleasant.
Decision makers also feel that they have too little influence on the
actual assignment of priorities to alternatives and many of them believe
that the outcomes of the method are not correct, because they are not
corresponding with their expectations (Klompé and Berghout, 1995).
Most methods in literature support
just a little part of the decision making process, being the evaluation
of the various alternatives. Others phases are hardly supported by these
methods, although a number of software development methods offer some
support during problem analyses and searching for possible alternatives.
More structured evaluations limit the chance of overlooking important (dis-)advantages
of an investment proposal, but do not guarantee a decision of high
quality, as the actual evaluation of the alternatives, as well as the
final decision making, is still done by the decision makers involved.
Further
on, working more or less carefully is just one aspect of a variety of
aspects influenced by individual and social aspects, for the decision
making process is still a human process in which both individual and
social aspects take part and influence the final decision. Individual
aspects concern mainly psychological characteristics like personality,
motivation and expectations regarding the alternatives and the goal to
reach. Social aspects on the other hand, consider decision making as a
group process and include for example conflicts, powerstructures and the
co-operation within the group. None of the mentioned decision supporting
methods supports one of these aspects. All restrict themselves to what
criteria to evaluate the alternatives on and how to define a priority
list based on this evaluation. This priority list is defined as the
result of the evaluation and is used to make a decision in the next
phase of the decision making process.
Discussions are only successful when they have an open character,
competitors don’t take up not-binding positions but feel
committed to the goal of the discussion, motivate their points of view,
remain consistent, give only relevant arguments and stay business-like.
This leaves two questions. First, which circumstances increase the
chance of good decision making processes and good discussions? Second,
what measures are permitted when a discussion tends to go wrong and is
there a solution for this from the social sciences? This solution exists
and contains, without mentioning the profound philosophic differences in
approach, two crucial factors: structural factors and
behavioural factors.
The
structural factors influencing the rationality of decision making,
concern the composition of the group. Important are possible differences
in power or contrasting interests, mutual dependence of the group’s
members and the setting of the group.
Differences of power
within a decision making group are often considered to be failing
factors. They would be at the cost of the openness of the discussions,
they would stimulate groupthink and have a negative influence on the
quality of decision making. On the other hand, differences in power
speed-up decision making and improve the co-ordination of the group
process (Pröpper and
Bleijenberg, 1995).
Senior managers, whose position is not at stake, can allow themselves to
be reasonable. The power-paradox says that it comes to power exercising
when actual differences in power are smaller. Just when differences in
power are small, a discussion often degenerates into an endless debate
in which people try to steal a march upon somebody instead of discussing
each other’s arguments. In the last case, a decision making process
rather becomes a strategic game then a process in which the results and
contents are central. Of course, it is not beneficial to the process
when it is led by a dictator. The personal characteristics of the most
influential participant are crucial. If this person already has an
explicit opinion about the desired solution of a problem, this could
cause an open discussion to fail due to differences in status.
Concerning the multifarious character of the decision making group two
aspects can be discerned. First, there are the differences of
interests between particular departments or sub-organizations. For
example, in a situation where the costs of a decision are for the
account of one division, whereas the benefits fall to the share of
another. Second, a particular interest will often imply a particular way
of thinking. For instance, in terms of economics, of sales, or product
quality. In the first situation there is a significant chance of
conformity and groupthink, by which new, creative solutions are
easily rejected. In the second situation one has to watch out for
polarisation, a lack of trust, communication and co-operation, by which,
in advance, new creative ideas are immediately labelled ‘strategic’
instead of really stating their contents. Just when partial agreement of
interests and heterogeneous views exist, a group tends to search
for more information and to look at new ideas seriously. It is therefore
important that the chairman takes care of different opinions right at
the beginning.
A third
factor forms the mutual dependence of the persons involved. As
mutual dependence increases, the need for information will increase and
so will the rationality of the decision making process. Consequently,
one is forced to incorporate more information in the decision making
process. Regarding the legitimacy of the decision making process it is
important to emphasise which parties are concerned, what their
conditions are, and what the consequences of the decision are for the
various persons involved. The legitimacy of a decision is determined
among others by the quality of the results, its comprehensibility, the
extent to which the decision can be defended, and the accuracy with
which the decision is made.
The
setting of the group appears to be of considerable importance to the
decision making process, as well. Does the process take place in a more
private or a more open setting? Both forms have particular advantages. A
private process has the advantage that discussions can take place more
freely, that one can reach an agreement sooner and that competitors tend
to stick less to their initial opinions: they do not want to fail in
front of other although they might already be convinced by other
arguments. An open process on the other hand, has the advantage that
additional information can be included more easily and the legitimacy of
the decision can be increased.
The
quality of the evaluation of an investment is not just determined by the
product itself, but also by the process producing the
decision. The way the alternatives are discussed is as equally important
as how the actual choice is made. Before making this choice, the
selection of alternatives takes place, the criteria for evaluation are
recorded and weights are assigned to these criteria. How can discussions
be stimulated and how can negative influences of the group process be
managed? First, one has to define what makes a discussion successful.
The requirements that can be defined to make a discussion ‘reasonable’,
are represented in table 3. These represent the behavioural factors.
Binding is regarded essential. This implies that decision makers are
bound to the goals of the decision and to their own statements. Decision
makers have to found their statements on arguments when expected. They
are also not allowed to contradict themselves, and they may only claim
things they believe themselves. Also, they may only give relevant
arguments and information, they must be business-driven and the debate
has to be open. This implies that all decision makers must be able to
participate in the discussion and that every point of view may be
formulated, argued and rejected.
|
Requirements of a reasonable discussion |
|
·
Commitment |
|
·
Motivation |
|
·
Consistency |
|
·
Relevance |
|
·
Business-likeness |
|
·
Openness |
Table 3: Requirements of
a reasonable discussion (Pröpper and Bleijenberg, 1995)
Many
causes may underlie unreasonable debates and the following list does not
intend to be exhaustive. First, the choice of an open attitude is often
seen as a weakness. While a reasonable discussion requires competitors
responding to each other, in practice people often hide behind external
sources. Often there is no distinction made between the correctness and
acceptability of a discussion. Differences in status can sometimes be
responsible for not rejecting unreasonable arguments (groupthink). The
way problems are presented may disturb the discussion of the solution
too (framing). Also, the available time can, if it is insufficient,
influence the decision making process negatively and might, if it is
superfluous, lead to a shift of evaluation criteria (change of decision
rule). Finally, the structure of the belief-systems of the competitors
is of influence. As central values are closer tied to the
decision makers, they are less willing to adjust their point of view on
new information and they are more open for counter-arguments. In
practice one can also observe that decision makers become unreasonable
when they are faced with another unreasonable decision maker. A
chairperson with insight in the decision making process and the
personality characteristics of the decision makers involved, can avoid
unreasonable debates.
6 Conclusions
This
article argues that successful decision making requires more than
professional skills. The structure in which the decision making process
is executed, the groups composition and in particular the choices made
by the leading person during the process are of crucial importance.
Behavioural sciences illustrate that a variety of social
structural aspects can have both positive and negative influences on the
quality of the decision making process. These aspects are also easy to
manipulate. Taking all aspects into account not only makes it possible
to predict the rationality of the decision making process, but also
makes it possible to adjust the composition of the groups and structure
in which it operates in advance. In this perspective it is bitter to see
that in practice these possibilities and restrictions are hardly
perceived in decision making processes regarding investments in
information systems. These evaluations, therefore, often result in a
confirmation of existing budgets, instead of an optimal allocation of
resources.
Literature
-
Antonides G
(1991), Psychology in economics and business. Kluwer Academic
Publishers, Enschede, The Netherlands.
-
Beach
L R (1990), Image theory: Decision making in Personal and
Organizational Context. John Wiley & Sons, England.
-
Berghout E W and Renkema T J W (1994), Evaluating information system
investment proposals: a comparative review of current methodologies.
Delft University of Technology, Research report number 94-27.
-
Blackler F and Brown C (1988), Theory
and practice in evaluation: the case of new information technologies.
In: IS Assessment (Bjorn-Andersen and Davis, Eds.), Elsevier,
The Netherlands.
-
Corwin R G (1969), Patterns of organizational conflict.
Administrative Science Quarterly, December, p. 522-542.
-
Douma S and Schreuder H (1992),
Economic approaches to organizations. Prentice Hall, London.
-
Farbey B, Land F and Target D A (1992), Evaluating investments in IT.
Journal of Information Technology, no. 7.
-
Farbey B, Land F and Target D A (1994), A Taxonomy of Evaluation
Methods. Proceedings of the First European Conference on IT
Investment Evaluation, Henley, United Kingdom, July 1994.
-
Harisson F E (1987), The managerial Decision-making Process. Houghton
Mifflin Company, Boston.
-
Homans G C (1950), The human group. Harcourt Brace, New York.
-
Huizenga F D (1995), Decision Theory. Reader Free University of
Amsterdam, Department of Social Sciences and Policy Analysis, Fourth
Edition.
-
Janis
I L and Mann L (1977), Decision making, A Psychological Analyses of
Conflict, Choice and Commitment. The Free Press, New York.
-
Kleindorfer P R, Kunreuther H C, and Schoemaker P J H (1993), Decision
Sciences: An Integrative perspective. Cambridge UP.
-
Klompé R H and Berghout E W (1995), Method is critical success factor
in IS evaluation, Proceedings of the Second European Conference on
IT Investment Evaluation, Henley, United Kingdom, July 1995.
-
Koopman P and Pool J (1992), Management and decision making in
organizations: a strategic perspective. Van Gorcum, Assen, The
Netherlands, in Dutch.
-
Powell P (1992), Information technology evaluation, is it different?
Journal of the Operations Research Society, no. 43, pp. 29-42.
-
Pröpper I and Bleijenberg I (1995), Discussions in Politics and
Administration: Guide for practice, Samsom, Alphen a/d Rijn, The
Netherlands, in Dutch.
-
Simon
H A (1979), Rational decision making in business organizations.
American Economic Review, May, p. 1-16.
-
Swinkels G J P and Irsel H G P (1992), Investments in information
technology: take IT or leave IT. Compact, p. 3-13, Summer,
1992, in Dutch.
-
Taylor R N (1975), Psychological
determinants of bounded rationality: implications for decision-making.
Decision Sciences, p. 409-429, No. 6.
-
Willcocks L (1992), Evaluating information technology investments:
research findings and reappraisal. Journal of Information
Technology, No. 2, p. 243-268.
|