1 Introduction

Investment in Information Systems (IS) by organizations requires justification in terms that can be understood and accepted by the organization's management. Like any other capital expenditure, the justification of IS has traditionally been seen in terms of cost savings. These so-called tangible benefits have been applied to operational systems in which aspects of the organization or business are in some way automated. In such systems,  rigorous accounting methods such as cost/revenue analysis, return on investment and cost-benefit analysis can be applied with varying degrees of success and the benefits can be stated in 'bottom-line' monetary terms.

Increasingly, Information Technology (IT) projects within organizations are moving beyond mandatory operational systems involved with automation of business function to non-operational systems. Management Information Systems (MIS) are procured to provide information about past performance, Decision Support Systems (DSS) are implemented to support organizational strategy and Executive Information Systems (EIS) are provided to enable strategic thinking and to provide information about the environment in which the organization is operating.  Such systems, which are not directly concerned with the everyday operation of the organization, are difficult to analyse, implement and justify. IT managers and users find applications further up the projects ladder (Farbey et al., 1993) difficult to understand. Without careful introduction into the organization, these systems fail to fulfil their potential. Indeed, users will attempt to reduce these systems to the level of operational systems without strategic impact. Hackney and McBride (1993) found a reluctance of IT practitioners within the public sector to use IS to tackle strategic issues. MIS, DSS and EIS are dismissed by managers as unimportant in the face of pressing needs for operational systems which are easier to justify in simple cost-saving terms.

Such strategic support systems pose significant problems for the IS evaluator who is seeking to justify the implementation of this technology to executive management. How can the success of the system be estimated when the outcomes of the system's use will not necessarily be directly attributable to the system itself? How can apparently non-measurable attributes be presented in such a way that changes can be observed? On what basis can a system whose use is not essential to the everyday operation of an organization be accepted?

The inability to evaluate effectively the benefits of IS before its implementation forms a significant barrier to the take-up of strategic support systems. Not only is evaluation deficient before the delivery of the system, it is also deficient, or even absent, after the implementation. Where formal evaluations are carried out, they often have a ritual function in justifying decisions or viewpoints about the suitability of a system which have already been determined (Walsham, 1993). The artificial application of numbers, scores and cost benefits  may lend credence to the selection decision but hides the real reasons behind the procurement of a system and fails to expose the actual benefits.

Attitudes to IS within the organization, the relations between subgroups, the expectations of the users as to what the system will achieve (both negatively and positively), and  ethical considerations are important in the acceptance and delivery of benefits by an IS system. Their importance rises above functional considerations and yet they are given scant attention in the formalist, functional approaches to IS benefits assessment.

This paper uses the evaluation and implementation of EIS as a vehicle for exploring the issues associated with strategic systems evaluation. The nature of EIS is discussed and the problems of their evaluation outlined. Two approaches to EIS evaluation are contrasted. It is argued that a formal rationalistic approach, while necessary and valuable, is not sufficient for the effective evaluation of EIS. An alternative, interpretive approach is required which addresses the social and organizational context in which the EIS will operate. The use of an interpretive approach is illustrated through a case study and, finally, its general applicability is  briefly discussed.

2 The nature of EIS

EIS was first identified in terms of the potential user population. Top executives who remained IT naive were seen as a fruitful ground for the spread of IS. This user culture, which prefers oral communication, did not see the direct relevance of IT and turned to other staff to provide them with information. Rockart and Treacy (1982) cited examples of forward-looking executives who made use of computers to access stores of data relevant to their decision making. EIS had to be easy to use and intuitive, providing easy access to a wide range of internal and external data sources. Information needed to be well presented, with options for graphical displays as well as reports. EIS has been characterised by the ability to 'drill down' from high-level summary data to detailed operational data. Beyond the definition of the user populations there has been little agreement on the nature of EIS. Edwards and Peppard (1993) identified four types of EIS. Conglomerate EIS systems enable subsidiaries of a company to be monitored by the parent company. Control EIS allows the monitoring of the success of a business unit. Competitive EIS allows executives to monitor external variables. Communication and Personal Support EIS includes diverse technologies such as electronic mail, word processors and spreadsheets. Such a wide-ranging classification indicates the difficulty in defining EIS.

A simple definition of an EIS is that it is an information bridge. It provides a connection between widely varying sources of data and the interconnected information that is needed in a particular business situation.  EIS is not limited to so-called executives (Friend, 1990; Wheeler et al., 1993), nor it is it a generic term for IT infrastructure such as electronic mail. Commercial products such as Forest and Trees (Channel Computing Inc), Commander EIS (Comshare Inc) and Command Centre EIS (Pilot Executive Software) have similar properties in that they provide access to corporate databases as well as public databases, they enable data to be summarised or examined in detail, they provide facilities for report design and graphical presentation and they will automatically refresh views from the data sources.

An information bridge such as EIS is required where the data  is badly organised, locked into several systems and not timely. Such organizations as, for example, the NHS, are data rich but lack the ability to turn this into information. Often this leads to a proliferation of paper-based reports which distance the user further from the data source (Stone, 1992; Houndeshel, 1992; Watson & Frolick, 1992). 

EIS has also been pursued as a means to monitor an organization at a high level. The use of aggregated and focused data enables the executive to monitor identified Critical Success Factors (CSFs). EIS can be designed on the basis of analysing the CSFs for an organization and collating the data required for the monitoring of these. This results in user-friendly reports systems for monitoring trends  but misses the need to look ahead and to relate the EIS to the business strategy (Holohan, 1992).

However, the purpose of an EIS is not just to facilitate easy access to data or to act as a high-level control system. By enabling managers at all levels to access data relevant to the decisions they are making, the EIS becomes an agent for organizational change. Information is gathered, hypotheses formed and action taken to change organizational activities or direction.  Indeed, an EIS will be of little value if the resources and the will to implement the changes suggested are not present.

In tandem with the role of EIS as a catalyst for organizational change is its role in organizational learning. An EIS should promote the competitive ability of an organization. It should enable the organization to look forward as well as backward, externally as well as internally. To this end, the EIS will access  external sources of data from stock information to medical abstracts. These sources will support the process of external scanning of the environment. EIS can be used as a means of analysing the environment in which an organization operates in order to respond more effectively to volatile and hostile change (Kaye, 1993).

3 The problem of EIS evaluation

EIS does not fit easily into the application portfolio (Ward, 1990). While addressing strategic objectives, it is not in itself necessarily a critical application; while providing support to executives and higher management, it will not directly improve organizational efficiency; while being seen as an R&D application it will not necessarily lead to innovation. Since it is difficult to categorise, it is difficult to identify an evaluation approach which is clearly suited to EIS.

Tangible benefits of EIS can be identified. Savings in information distribution costs can be estimated. The costs of memos and documents in terms of  paper, copying, binding and mailing can be estimated.  Staff time saved that would otherwise be used manually seeking information can be estimated.  The cost of using an EIS can be compared with the cost of using other sources for obtaining specific data (Belcher & Watson, 1993). However, all this is peripheral to the core benefits of EIS, which lie in the extent to which it supports more informed decision making and the extent to which it promotes organizational learning and organizational change. These benefits will be neither technical or operational. They will be embedded in the culture of the organization and only indirectly visible through the changing nature of the organization.

The nature of such benefits depends on the context of the organization, both internally and externally, and on the processes occurring within the organization at many levels. Response to change is dependent on those who make the response. Good information provided by EIS can still result in bad decisions by inadequate executives, which could then be blamed on the EIS.  Organizational learning is affected by the nature of the organization. Indeed the value of learning to the organization, while recognised as being extremely important, is notoriously difficult to measure. While methods of assessing learning could be applied to the organization and particular participants in post-implementation evaluation, the assessment of possible organizational learning is more difficult.

The potential for  organizational change will depend on the current state of the organization and on its culture and ethos.  Since EIS both encourages and supports organizational change, an organization which is not ready to change will obtain less value from an EIS than an organization which is seeking change in response to internal of external factors. In order for the potential of EIS to be realised, there must be good organizational fit. This is a key issue in the evaluation of IS.  The alignment of IS to the objectives of an organization has long been recognised as being poor and research has been directed towards this problem (Baets, 1992; Iivari,1992; Burn, 1993). This lack of fit frequently applies to the individual systems as well as to the entire strategy.

The success of EIS will  be  more likely if there is a match between the organizational function of EIS and the state of the organization in which it is embedded. EIS will only be suitable for a small subset of organizations. Even for organizations where a match does exist, the suitability of EIS is dynamic and may be reduced as the state of the organization changes. The organization must be ready to receive an EIS system. Indeed, it may be more appropriate to ask, 'Is the organization good enough for an EIS system?', rather than 'Is the EIS system good enough for the organization?'.  A readiness survey would be a useful element of any evaluation  in which the organization's context and culture are examined to see whether an EIS would be an appropriate application for the organization and  the organization's resources and management approach are studied to assure that any changes suggested through the use of an EIS could in fact be implemented.  Such an 'EIS driving test' would reduce the risk of failure through an inadequate match between EIS and the organizational culture.

The fact that EIS benefits are linked to the social and political nature of the organization increases the difficulty participants have in justifying its procurement. EIS justification in organizations is based on intuition, perceived strategic necessity or fashion. Most EIS investment is made on an act of faith by senior personnel (Bird, 1991). In one survey, 95% of respondents indicated that the justification of EIS was intuitive (Watson et al, 1991). This arises from a perception that there is no real alternative to a hard, formalistic cost-based justification. In the absence of a formal, numeric approach to evaluation, it is reduced to a matter of gut feel.

Reliance on gut feel for the justification of IT is a general problem (Symons, 1990). This reliance is more likely in the case of EIS evaluation because of the presence of an executive sponsor.  EIS implementation is dependent on top management support. Usually, a senior executive, aware of an organizational problem, alights on EIS as the solution. The executive champions the use of EIS and, with the help of an implementation sponsor, drives the investment in EIS. The need for an executive sponsor has been so prevalent in EIS uptake, that it has been identified as key to successful EIS (Houdeshel & Watson, 1987). However, this reliance on an executive sponsor is a barrier to both effective evaluation and organizational acceptance. The forcefulness of the sponsor leads to implementation of EIS without due attention to its benefits and, most importantly, its organizational fit. Frequently, the departure of the executive sponsor leads to the demise of the EIS (Wheeler et al., 1993) because it has not been embedded in the organization. There has to be organizational take-up of a system such as an EIS, and not just individual take-up. This has arisen partly from the perception of an EIS as a system targeted at a few individuals, or even one individual within an organization.

Faced with the diverse and soft nature of EIS benefits and the reliance of organizations on the gut-feel of one or two key participants, an alternative approach to EIS evaluation must be found. Current approaches to the evaluation of systems such as EIS and DSS are basically functionalist. It may be that a more radical approach to the evaluation of EIS is required since an EIS can be seen as a complex social object (Symons, 1991) which cannot be evaluated solely functionally. The functionalist approach will now be considered in contrast with an alternative, interpretive approach.

4 Approaches to IS evaluation

4.1 Functionalist

Traditional approaches to IS evaluation employ cost/benefit analysis or scoring techniques. The former are inappropriate to systems such as EIS with value-based benefits. Ranking and scoring based methodologies such as information economics (Parker et al., 1988) can tend to give subjective views a pseudo-scientific veneer. Scoring systems may allow the cancellation of the impact of some factors within the overall assessment (Willcocks & Lester, 1993).  The application of mathematical strategies to counteract any bias within the evaluation (see, for example, Anderson, 1990) can result in an evaluation whose technical value is over-emphasised. Indeed, such a technical approach can be manipulated to justify what is actually a political decision. An appropriate method for EIS evaluation should address political, social and technical issues.

Information Economics has been extensively reviewed elsewhere (Ward, 1990; Wiseman,1992; Willcocks & Lester, 1993; Farbey et al.,1993). Its importance lies in the emphasis on addressing  intangibles and risks through value linking, value acceleration and value restructuring. However, while attempting to overcome the limits of simple cost-benefit analysis, it carries the same risk of a technically-based method in being open to misinterpretation and abuse by the stakeholders.

The search for formalistic approaches to evaluation can be carried to extremes where mathematical and theoretical frameworks are provided that are divorced from managerial and organizational reality (see, for example, Marsden & Pingry, 1993).

A more pragmatic method of evaluation which has been applied to DSS is value analysis (Keen, 1981). This evaluation is carried out in the context of iterative prototyping. DSS are treated as research and development tools. A view is taken on the risk of initially investing in a prototype, based on some simple questions about what will be obtained from the system and what is seen as an acceptable cost for this research-based activity. Keen's approach, in which value is first established and then an acceptable cost threshold agreed, recognises that innovative applications involve uncertainty and risk. The analogy with the procurement of training courses within a company is appropriate. The  procurement of a training course is based on perceived need and long-term value rather than any formal evaluation method. However, while Keen's approach highlights process, it does not address contextual issues.

Formal rationalistic approaches are limited by their narrow focus on the system itself and on the quantification of benefits, omitting consideration of the wider organizational issues. The evaluation of IS must extend beyond prescriptive management frameworks. The social and political contexts within which the system will be utilised are as important as the system's technical features. (Waema & Walsham, 1990). The emphasis within functional approaches on quantifiable data obscures the subjective aspects of information system evaluation. IS benefit evaluation cannot be made completely objective.

Indeed, the acceptance of a system is ultimately dependent on the perceptions of those who use it. Objective measures of the value of a system may well be set aside if the system does not fit the organizational culture.  The system must be perceived as a success. An understanding of the user's perception of the needs and benefits of a system are important for effective evaluation and are not addressed in quantitative approaches.

4.2 Interpretivist

The interpretive approach addresses qualitative issues and is aimed at producing an understanding of the social contexts and the social processes of the organization into which the IS is to be introduced. The interpretive paradigm seeks to understand the perceptions of the people who are to be involved with the system. Within the organization, subgroups will have shared meanings or perceptions that are more subjective in nature than objective.

The success or failure of an information system and the delivery of benefits are dependent on the people who are using it. A successful evaluation approach will seek to understand the users' perception of the proposed system.

Interpretivism is concerned with approaches to the users' understanding of reality. It asserts that such knowledge, within the domain of human action, is necessarily a social construction and inevitably subjective (Walsham, 1993). The interpretive approach is based on examination of content, context, process and context/process linkage. A broad interpretive framework is outlined in table 1.

In analysing the content, the problem requiring an IS solution must be understood. The products, processes and systems of the organization must be investigated. Also the nature of the proposed IS must be analysed. The second strand is an understanding of the social context into which the information system will be placed. This comprises a static view of the organization.Thirdly the social process by which the information system will influence the organization is examined. This dynamic view encompasses both a cultural and a political perspective.

The final element in the interpretive framework concerns the linkage between social context and social process. It is here that structuration theory provides the key conceptual approach (Walsham & Han, 1991). Structuration theory addresses the link between human actions - the action of participants in the EIS - with social structure - the developing organizational structures within which the EIS are situated.   Human participants who work within the norms, rules and conventions of an organization are not behaving passively, rather they are reinforcing the organizational structures. There is therefore a circle of influence: the participants are influenced by the social structures and in turn, through their interactions, they influence the social structures, either reproducing them or changing them.

Giddens (1984) breaks down social structure into three dimensions. Firstly, there are structures of meaning. These are the organizational structures as understood by the participants, which are mediated through interpretive schemes. We produce a shared understanding of  the organization through communication. Secondly, there are structures of domination, social power structures mediated by control of resources. For example, executives have power within the organization because of their ability to allocate materials and resources. Use of that power can reinforce organizational structures or change them. Thirdly, there are structures of legitimation, the social and legal rules, which are mediated by the norms and standards of the organization and enforced by sanctions applied within the organization. These ideas have a powerful role in making the researcher aware of possible political and cultural issues that should be considered in the evaluation of EIS.

The primary vehicle for interpretive research in IS is the case study. Longitudinal case studies, carried out over a reasonable period of time, enable an understanding of the processes involved. However, detailed historical reconstruction, together with a picture of the current situation within the organization, can provide a reasonable basis for making some judgement concerning the intangible benefits of procuring an EIS system. Furthermore, case studies from other similar organizations, when presented to senior management, can offer as convincing justification for procurement as any hard, financial study.    

The use of an interpretive framework to examine an organization's history and culture will support the identification of the intangible benefits which may arise from the use of the IS. The remainder of this paper will look briefly at a case study where EIS was successfully applied and propose the use of an interpretive framework as a means of justifying investment in an EIS.

Table 1: Interpretive framework for benefits evaluation.

5 Outline Case History

The Contracting Company is a major defence contractor, internationally active within the marketplace.  In 1987, a need to improve IS was recognised. IS were centrally based around a mainframe and the production of inflexible reports. A need was identified for data to be provided quickly and flexibly. Initially, a relational database was procured which met some of the needs. However, after 12 months, there was an increasing awareness of the importance of PCs and a requirement to move away from keyboard-based applications. This led to EIS being reviewed.

The directors believed that they wanted an EIS but could not define their exact needs. They appointed consultants to report on the provision of better data. Their proposal, for a complete office system, was rejected as being too expensive and the project was restricted in scope. The company's data processing function, known as Corporate Computer Services (CCS), was invited to prototype an EIS using a spreadsheet-like front end to the relational database.

However, the culture of CCS, centred on producing fixed format reports, produced a prototype which the head of finance, acting as sponsor, did not think suitable for his purposes. As a result, in 1990 a separate group, Management Systems, was set up to produce a more flexible prototype.

The setting-up of this group was an act of faith by the head of finance. There was no formal evaluation of the benefits of EIS, since knowledge as to the nature of EIS was limited. Staff were sent on training courses to learn to use Holos, a tool for developing multi-dimensional spreadsheets. Time was invested in studying the requirements for the system. A year was spent experimenting on possible designs, particularly addressing problems of data navigation and intuitive interfaces. At the end of 1991, the group began developing a simple financial system. This budget model was followed up by the development of a manpower system and a marketing system.

Take-up of the system was encouraged by the active support of higher management.  In marketing, the marketing manager used the system online in meetings to demonstrate its effectiveness as an alternative to reams of paper-based reports. In finance, the director demanded that budgets be produced using the new EIS system in preference to old spreadsheets.

It took longer to enter data in the new EIS system than in the old spreadsheets. This acted as a disincentive to conversion. While staff were not stopped from using the old method, it was made clear that results were required from the new system. However managers could obtain information much more quickly from the new system. It was the speed of retrieval of data, rather than of data entry, that encouraged its take-up.

The overall success of this system has been demonstrated by its spread through the organization and the increasing resources allocated to it by the directors. The Contracting Company EIS system now has 120 users, of which up to 20 may be connected at any one time. Two years on, the Management Systems team has grown from two to 11 staff.  The EIS supports a range of meetings and has catalysed a culture change. Managers now take responsibility for the data entered into the EIS system. Actual project data are retrieved directly from a mainframe and forecast data are entered manually. The fact that the data are now trusted reduce the amount of meeting time taken up in arguments about figures.  Also flexible reports can be obtained and managers have information at their fingertips.

However, the success of the EIS system within the Contracting Company has not depended on tangible benefits. There is a user perception that it is delivering what they want and is improving their ability to respond to the changing business environment. The system has still not been formally justified although it now represents a substantial investment.

It was felt that overheads were being reduced. Less overtime was being spent in gathering together figures. At budget time, corridors no longer filled with boxes of photocopied reports. If a correction was required, it was no longer necessary to replace one sheet in every set of photocopied  reports. The EIS was perceived to save time because it was no longer necessary to walk down to Accounts to get figures, with the usual delays and impromptu meetings that followed.  Even these apparent tangible benefits - saved managerial time, reduced overtime, saved photocopying - could not be proved in cost-saving terms.

For the Contracting Company, the EIS was  the right system at the right time. The company's operating environment was changing radically. The defence market was shrinking with the end of the Cold War. The advent of  competitive bidding for Government contracts brought an end to the days of cost-plus work.  The company had to be more responsive and more lean. Projects had to be managed properly  and unproductive manpower removed. The increasing influence of global communication, EDI (Electronic Data Interchange) and new technologies demanded a response from the company.

Table 2 identifies some themes, within an interpretive framework, of importance to the success of EIS within the Contracting Company. Attempts to measure  the benefit of EIS to the Contracting Company formally  would produce some feeble figures as to hours of staff time saved and paper saved. The actual evaluation of the EIS involves addressing the social and political issues. Ultimately, the benefit of EIS to the Contracting Company may be seen in its survival as an organization, but it will not be possible to attribute its survival, or its increased profitability,  to the EIS.

Table 2 : EIS within the Contracting Company.

6 Interpretive evaluation of EIS investment

The benefits of EIS are organizational. These can only be identified by analysing the culture of the organization and showing how EIS strengthens the organization culturally and politically. Therefore, in assessing the benefit of EIS to an organization, the organizational fit of EIS must be examined closely.  If the organizational fit of EIS is good, as it was in the case of the Contracting Company, then benefits will accrue to the organization, in terms of supporting organizational change, increased market share and better ability to compete. Most importantly, EIS will support a process of organizational learning and enable a strategic response to change.

An interpretive approach to evaluation may help participants to identify the important issues to be considered.  Within a framework of content, social context, social process and context/process linkage, questions can be asked concerning the nature and maturity of an organization which will indicate whether it is likely to benefit from EIS. Some of these issues are highlighted in Table 3. EIS may flourish where there is a high level of organizational change. The maturity of the organization, the availability of data and the extent of unanimity of management are all important for successful use of EIS. The success of EIS will rest on the perception of the stakeholders that their needs are being met.

In interpreting the benefits of EIS we must understand the current and historical context current and historical. Stakeholders' views will change and will need to be understood. The acceptance of EIS will rest on the attainment of a common view as to what its benefits are, which will be supported by technical measurements but not dependent on them. Context should be considered at several levels. Individual, organizational and national or even international context will have a bearing on the value of EIS. An organisation pressed to change by management and forced to change by external events may gain more value from the functions of an EIS that identify exceptions and trends. The nature of managerial culture will also affect the value that can be obtained from an EIS.

The process by which the point  at which a possible need for an EIS is recognised is itself an area for consideration.  The extent of management support and the change occurring within the organization  may well influence possible benefit. The process by which an evaluation  occurs may also influence benefits, both positively and negatively. While executives may be involved in supporting a proposal for an EIS, the benefits assessment may be seen as a technical process left to the IS professionals. The benefits assessment should be carried out by the executives but they are often too busy to get involved.

Finally, structuration theory is particularly relevant to EIS and their assessment. It forms one organisational context where there occurs 'a process of selective information filtering whereby strategically placed actors seek reflexively to regulate the overall conditions of the system reproduction either to keep things as they are or to change them' (Giddens 1984, p. 27).

Table 3 : The Justification of EIS Investment : an interpretive framework.

7 Conclusions

This paper has introduced the application of the interpretive approach to IS feasibility evaluation, focusing on one type of IS: the Executive Information System. Using the case study approach, some tentative guidelines as to whether an EIS will be of benefit to an organization have been identified. EIS are essentially agents of organizational change and catalysts for organizational learning. The success of EIS will depend on identifying the correct role for these systems within an organization and demonstrating organizational fit. An interpretive approach provides a means of embracing the social, political and cultural issues that are key to the success of any IS, regardless of the technical procedures that have been applied. Further research, involving case studies of successful and unsuccessful EIS application in a variety of organizations, will lead to refinement of the approach.

The interpretive approach may provide fruitful insights as to the benefits to an organization of a wide range of IS where the possible benefits are at least intangible, if not unknown. Details of the organization and its context, together with an analysis of the social processes within the organization, can be related to the nature of the IS whose procurement is being considered. The applicability of this approach to the process of evaluation has been clearly shown by Farbey, Land and  Targett (1993, p. 87). This paper has sought to illustrate its appropriateness to the process of matching up an IS to an organization and identifying the benefits specific to that organization and no other. In any evaluation exercise the requirements for the system and the benefits will be unique because the organization is unique. Approaches to evaluation should seek to shed light on that uniqueness and derive a benefits profile that takes into account the cultural and political issues. It is the task of the evaluator  to ensure that the selected IS fits the organization in which it is to  grow. A plant grown in the wrong soil  and the wrong environmental conditions will wither and die. The plant selected must be the most suitable for the soil. Similarly, the correct IS to match the organizational soil must be selected if it is to flourish and yield benefits to its host organization.

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Acknowlegdement: This paper was presented at the 1st European Conference on Information Technology Evaluation, Henley-on-Thames, 1994.

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