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1. Introduction
The current concept of evaluation
of information technology makes certain assumptions. These centre in
broad terms on the ability of evaluation systems to represent
initiatives in ways that allow efficacious judgements to be taken. As a
consequence of this assumption, representational faithfulness is assumed
to be a primary requirement. Given representational faithfulness, it is
assumed, rational decisions can be taken, and evaluation can be used to
foster learning within feedback cycles. This assumption is consistent
with a particular kind of leadership, which has been termed
“transactional”. Transactional leadership is based on the premise that
leaders clarify the goals of subordinates, and provide rewards and
punishments concomitant with performance against goals. Transactional
leadership clearly has an important role to play within the modern
enterprise but there is an alternative: “transformational” leadership
(Burns, 1978). Transformational leadership begins with assumptions which
differ markedly from transactional leadership, and thereby implies a
different approach to evaluation. In broad terms, these assumptions
centre on achieving results by stimulating subordinates; rather than
through systems of contingent reward. The central question to be pursued
in this paper concerns the relevance and implications of transactional
and transformational leadership for the practice of information
technology evaluation.
The next section considers
transactional leadership and explains its relationship to evaluation.
Limitations of evaluation based upon evaluation and transactional
leadership are explored both through the existing literature and through
an existing study of the views of a group of Financial Directors of UK
FTSE top-500 companies (all quotations used within this paper are taken
from McAulay et al, 1997). Transformational leadership is then presented
and comments made by the Financial Directors are used to suggest ways in
which evaluation can be aligned with this form of leadership. The
implicit argument is that familiar problems that are associated with the
exercise of evaluation as framed by transactional leadership can be
avoided within transformational leadership. The implication of the paper
is that the exercise of evaluation should not be understood as an
ontological inevitability but as a consequence of context, including the
context provided by leadership.
2. Transactional leadership
The leader’s role within the
transactional view of leadership is one of clarification; leaders
clarify the role of subordinates and motivate them through rewards for
good performance and punishments for aberrant behaviour. Transactional
leadership stresses contract and contingent reinforcement (Bass, 1985).
It is underpinned by path-goal theory, which establishes a role for the
leader as the person who points out to subordinates the “paths to
successful effort” (Bass, 1985, pg. 127). Leadership effectiveness is
experienced in terms of the expectancy theory of motivation and
cost-benefit considerations (Bass, 1985, pg. 5); motivation is
attributed to subordinates’ expectations that they will be able to
improve performance and receive concomitant rewards. Bass (1985, pg.
123) expresses the basic tenets of transactional leadership in terms of
Blanchard and Johnson’s (1982) tenets of “one minute management”:
§ “Set goals with
subordinates.
§ Clarify what performance
is needed to reach the goals.
§ Tell inexperienced
subordinates what they did right, how you feel about it, and encourage
more of the same.
§ Tell experienced
subordinates, when necessary, what they specifically are doing wrong and
how you feel about …”
Transactional leadership and
currently dominant evaluation principles are potentially mutually
reinforcing. In principle, transactional leaders influence others
through goal setting, by clarifying desired outcomes and by providing
feedback (Dvir et al, 2002). Summative evaluation is likewise capable of
influencing action through the provision of goals and the clarification
of desired outcomes, by enhancing understanding of cause-effect
relationships, and through feedback which incorporates ex ante
evaluation or post implementation audit (Farbey et al, 1999). In
practice, alignment between leadership and evaluation may be important
for both performance and the well being of subordinates. Consistent with
the principles of transactional leadership, leaders communicate
expectations to subordinates and thus convey information about the roles
that individuals must fulfil (Katz and Kahn, 1978). Evaluation which is
based upon accounting information likewise communicates role
expectations (Hartmann, 2000, pg. 467).
The non-alignment of communicative
acts associated with leaders and evaluation systems provides a source of
role conflict and role ambiguity, which would not otherwise be evident.
For instance, where the leader and the accounting information system
convey the message that the selection of, say, project A is in the best
interests of the company, there is no conflict or ambiguity for a
subordinate who is entrusted with managing project A. However, where a
leader argues in favour of project B on strategic grounds, whilst the
accounting information system indicates that project A is the optimal
choice on grounds of rational choice, conflict and ambiguity are
apparent. Role conflict and role ambiguity have consistently been shown
to have a negative impact on performance, commitment, involvement,
tension, anxiety and propensity to leave the firm (King and King, 1990).
Transactional leadership therefore
has important advantages, especially if leadership and
evaluation-as-rational-choice are to be aligned. However,
evaluation-as-rational-choice has consistently been shown to be
problematic. In particular, it depends upon the omniscience of the
leader and the ability of the leader to specify expectations in
unambiguous and non-conflictual terms. Transactional leadership depends
upon diagnosis and information. It relies upon management by exception
and negative feedback (Bass, 1985, pp. 135-149). Transactional
leadership is therefore “logically compelling as long as we can posit
that man is a rational and economic being” (Bass, 1985, pg. 6). It is
therefore important that we consider the implications of evaluation as
rational choice if we are to understand the consequences of applying
evaluation from a transactional leadership perspective.
3. Evaluation as rational choice
March (1997, pp. 10-11) summarises
the assumptions of rational choice under four headings:
§ A knowledge of
alternatives. This assumes that alternatives can be defined as the basis
for systematic analysis.
§ A knowledge of
consequences. This assumes that systematic analysis can address the
consequences of each of the alternatives.
§ A consistent preference
ordering. This assumes that consequences can be valued in a consistent
manner.
§ A decision rule. This
assumes that a rule can be applied which can determine which of the
alternatives is the most highly valued.
These four assumptions characterise
the literature on information technology evaluation, but these
assumptions can be problematised when the views of practising experts
are considered. In the following sections, each aspect of rational
choice is viewed in turn by considering briefly writings in information
technology evaluation and responses from Financial Directors involved in
the study by McAulay et al (1997).
3.1 A knowledge of
alternatives
Projects have different aims and
levels of risk. Projects can be classified, for instance, as “strategic,
informational and transactional” (Weill and Olson, 1989) or “efficiency,
effectiveness or other” (Fitzgerald, 1998). Within a strategic view of
the firm, each project represents an alternative means by which
organisational objectives can be met and, “business strategy formulation
will have resulted in the identification of a number of effective IT/IS
projects” (Fitzgerald, 1998, pg. 21). This particular strategic view is
consistent with the basic premise of transactional leadership; that
leaders clarify the subordinate’s role (Bass, 1985, pg. 127).
The world of Financial Directors,
however, is not one in which goals and alternatives are definitively
clear; because their world is in a constant state of flux and change.
Their view is consistent with the resource-based view of the firm, in
which competitive advantage is based on knowledge, which is not
concerned solely with that which is explicit and which can be clearly
communicated throughout the organisational hierarchy, but also with
tacit knowledge; with the consequence that effective investment
evaluation requires face-to-face interactions (Grant, 1996; Nonaka and
Takeuchi, 1995; Spender and Grant, 1996; Porter, 1992):
“One of the strengths that any
company [with] a management team that's been around for quite a long
while, and worked with each other, is that you actually get to know each
other. One of the dangers of management teams that are put together
quickly is that they tend to depend rather a lot on what is written down
and what the financial projections are. The challenge in all of these
things is that the real world doesn't usually work out the way the in
which you put into projections. And if it does, you ask, you worry. It
sounds very odd to say, but … things that come in exactly as they
supposed to … you tend to think that someone's manipulating numbers,
because the world isn't like that. Things change so often. Something
could be worse than the figures but it's good news. I think one has to
recognise that true competitive advantage takes time to create. The
reason that we are such a profitable company, and we make good returns,
is because a lot of the things that we do, and a lot of the position
that we've developed, is very difficult to replicate very quickly.
Because we're in an industry where things move very quickly, and you
therefore have to be constantly changing, modernising your product, and
have to be using all the latest technologies you're capable of,
continuously differentiating yourself, rather than allowing that
differentiation to be eroded.”
The Directors live in an indefinite
world, which takes for granted that certain investments cannot be
measured or represented in precise terms of goals and measurable
expectations:
“It's very difficult if not
impossible to quantify savings. I think it's other factors that you look
at. In order to provide the same level of management information that I
do now with the computer, I would need an additional army of people. But
I've never actually put a project forward to the Main Board to say, "Can
I spend a hundred and fifty thousand on an enhancement of the system
because I'm going to save six people". We’ve been able to say, “Although
we've not replaced any staff, we've saved people's time””.
Change implies that evaluation is
therefore an ongoing, fluid, flexible and responsive process, where
goals and expectations are reviewed constantly:
“We say, "We think this is the sort
of amounts of money we are prepared to spend". But if we're in a decent
financial state, [we] shouldn't be limited [in] any one particular year
to any [particular] amount of money. We should be reviewing it as we go
through the year, rather than assuming we must hit a budgeted number.”
The role of leadership and
evaluation is therefore not one of clarifying goals and alternatives;
because goals and alternatives evolve flexibly to meet the changing
requirements of the business.
3.2 A knowledge of consequences
Fitzgerald (1998, pg 20) states
that, “The first task, in most evaluations, is the identification of
costs …. The objective is to identify fully the costs associated with
the project ….” Information technology evaluation therefore assumes
knowledge of the consequences of projects for resources, as measured in
cost terms. Fitzgerald broadens the analysis to include the need for
knowledge of consequences as expressed in terms of strategy, benefits
and second order effects, which are unanticipated consequences. The need
for knowledge of consequences has thus become axiomatic within the
literature to the point that it has consistently been seen to be a
“problem” within the evaluation process, particularly in terms of
assessing costs and benefits (Ballantine et al, 1996).
For instance, let us begin with an
observation provided by Ward et al (1996, pg. 223) to the effect that
benefits can be overstated in project evaluations “in order to gain
investment approval”. The source of this behavioural response can be
traced to the unanticipated consequences of transactional leadership,
where, “Subordinates may take shortcuts to complete the exchange of
reward for compliance” (Bass, 1985, pg. 145). Amongst the list of
shortcuts listed by Bass is “game playing”, and this has been
extensively studied within the respected accounting literature on
reliance on accounting performance measures (Hartmann, 2000). For
example, Hopwood (1972, pg. 170) found that emphasising accounting
metrics leads to manipulation of data consistent with the Financial
Director’s pithy comment:
“It doesn't work if [the] Finance
Director says, "I won't accept this project because that number's too
high" So what do people do? They change the number.”
3.3 A consistent
preference ordering
Nutt (1998, pg. 351) concludes
that, “many decision makers could benefit from training that sharpens
their knowledge of analytical tools found to be useful in the evaluation
of alternatives and cautions them about the pitfalls of subjective and
judgemental approaches”. The “analytical tools” that Nutt has in mind
are various, include both quantitative and qualitative approaches, and
“offer a variety of ways for decision makers to reliably rank
alternatives, using one or several criteria” (pg. 336).
Whilst appreciating the importance
of tools, the world of the Financial Directors is somewhat different to
that implicit in Nutt’s (1998) prescriptions. The key point is that
tools do not necessarily provide the means through which preferences can
be expressed; there are non-quantifiable elements in decision making
which are irreducible to the logic of calculation. The subjective
element is expressed in the following quotation in terms of “liking” (or
the preferences which may be expressed in terms of broad strategy) and
the intrinsic physical qualities of the world which cannot be expressed
numerically.
“I think the role of the numbers is
to get you through the hurdles; get you through the hoops before they
even waste anyone's time. It’s to actually do the groundwork and make
sure you've collected as much evidence as you can. Otherwise, you have a
system where someone says, "oh"; and no-one knows what the hell it is.
But all of these projects are on the basis of comparing apples with
pears. And, OK, you can reduce them to numbers. But you can't tell me
that a pound of pears is the same as a pound of apples. Even if they
both cost a pound each they're not. It will also depend on whether you
like apples. Whether you like pears. Are they bruised?” (S17).
3.4 A decision rule
Although there are numerous
techniques available to those who seek to evaluate information
technology (Powell, 1992), the use of accounting information is widely
used to provide a decision rule (Bacon, 1992). In particular, discounted
cash flow techniques are important for the evaluation of large projects,
although payback is a widely used criteria (Bacon, 1992, pg. 347). Both
accounting-based and other techniques imply a decision rule; in the case
of discounted cash flow, this would be, “select the projects with the
highest net present value” and in the case of pay, this would be,
“select the projects with the shortest payback”.
The automatic use of a rule
disguises the importance of broader and deeper judgements that are
implicated in long-term decision-making. The Financial Director in the
quote below presents the refinement of decision rules as something of
interest to academics: but the final decision has to be strategic; “the
balance across the portfolio of the things that are good for your
business”:
“[There is] something of a chasm
between the way academics tend to see it and the way it actually works
in practice. [Academics] get very excited about these mathematical
models of the cost of equity capital, the risk free rates of returns,
and all these sorts of things. I don't think in my experience that
they're a very significant factor in terms of capital decisions. I think
that, actually, in many ways, the DCF bit is just a part of the tool-kit
now. I think that things are very much more seen in a strategic sense. I
think that one of the dilemmas that you face is that the problems of DCF
calculation is that it makes near term cash flows seem to be very
important. It's jolly interesting if you're only interested in the short
term, but, you know, [in] the long term you've got to get the balance
across your portfolio of the things that are good for your business”.
The principles of rational
decision-making can therefore be problematised by considering the
perspectives of practitioners. Alternatives to transactional leadership
and rational decision making, which align more closely with the worlds
of the Financial Directors, remain largely marginalized, but have
nevertheless been considered by the literature which addresses
information technology evaluation. In the next section, the alternatives
to rational decision making are first considered before the
possibilities implicit in transformational leadership are explored.
4. Transformational leadership
March (1997, pg. 17) points out
that the assumption of rational choice neglects some aspects which have
been shown to be associated with decision making in practice. In
particular, March explores the possibility that individuals make
decisions which are appropriate to specific situations and to the
identity of the decision maker, even where this may not serve
self-interest. This perspective opens up the possibility that evaluation
may be based on putative irrational grounds. This possibility is
consistent with critiques of discounted cash flow systems of evaluation,
which centre on the notion that the modern world is typified by the
impossibility of forecasting and doubt about values (Singer, 1994).
Brunsson (1985) has suggested that capital investment appraisal which
follows rational assumptions can impede change, whilst the changes
implied by evaluation are promoted through personal motivation,
commitment and confidence. Powell (1992), resolves the question as to
whether information technology is different to other kinds of projects,
in much the same terms as Brunsson, by quoting Williams, “The important
thing in business is not to make good forecasts but to make them come
true”. Serafeimidis and Smithson (2000, pg. 102) conclude, “The
traditional approach to IS evaluation, based on narrow technical and
accounting terms, has limited relevance to the role of IS in today’s
organizations. Organizations are moving towards more entrepreneurial
approaches, embodying some of the thinking of the interpretivist stream
of IS research”.
Bass (1999, pg 9) suggests that,
“Changes in the marketplace and workforce … have resulted in the need
for leaders to become more transformational and less transactional if
they [are] to remain effective”. Transformational leadership includes
charisma, and depends not upon path-goal theory but upon the ability of
the leader to inspire subordinates, and to provide intellectual
stimulation and consideration at a personal level. The flattening of
organisational hierarchy, dependence upon autonomous teams of
professionals (who have a greater situationally-dependent technical
knowledge than their leaders), and changes in expectations about
lifetime employment are associated with the need for leaders to move
away from reliance upon contingent reinforcement towards the ability to
secure corporate citizenship and identification with organisational
values (Bass, 1999, pg. 10). Transformational leadership provides an
alternative to transactional leadership, and in the two decades since
its formalisation has been shown to be positively associated with
performance; this relationship is stronger than for the association
between transactional leadership and performance (Dvir et al, 2002).
Bass (1999, pg. 11) argues that,
“Transformational leadership refers to the leader moving the follower
beyond immediate self-interests through idealized influence (charisma),
inspiration, intellectual stimulation, or individualized consideration”.
Of these, there is evidence within the reasoning of the Financial
Directors that evaluation can be used as a form of intellectual
stimulation. Intellectual stimulation “refers to how leaders question
the status quo, appeal to followers’ intellect to make them question
their assumptions, and invite innovative and creative solutions to
problems” (Antanakis and House, 2002, pg. 10).
The discipline of evaluation
encourages subordinates to ask questions:
“It's not accurate questions. Or
having to answer [which] is important. It's the fact that if they know
they will have to answer questions, they will do thinking that they
wouldn't otherwise have done. And that thinking may lead them to a
different decision that they wouldn’t have reached otherwise. Instead of
just spending money, and thinking whether it was worth it later, they'll
think very carefully through, "What money do I think I'll need to
spend?", "Why?", "What would I want it for?", "What will the benefits
be?" So it imposes some discipline on thought and action.”
The point is that those at the top
of organisations are not in the best position to take decisions; they
are not omniscient:
“Well, really, decisions are made
as far down in an organisation as you can possibly can. I think that's
the answer. I think the role of the accountant is changing quite
substantially. The structured company is gone or going. This whole
concept that there's [a] big information flow, everything [going] up the
company to the Finance Director, who makes the decision; you know,
everybody stands admiring; it's OK. But the whole way in which we're
going as an organisation is that the executive directors are more an
enabling force. Their judgement is to ask all the right sort of
questions. But to try and encourage the people at all levels of the
organisation to accept as much responsibility as possible. The way you
get numbers to work is that people accept that they're their numbers.”
Initiatives reside with managers
down the hierarchy and evaluation is concerned with encouraging those
managers to innovate:
“So, we do try as much as possible
to get the people, the staff and the management, to come up with ideas
on how they can improve things. I think as a business we're getting
better at it. We're not as good as we'd like to have been in the past.
It's very hard, when you're as successful as we've been, to get people
to want to change. Change management is living hell. So why go through
it when you're the most profitable [business in the sector]?"
Fundamentally, the process is
centred upon individuals rather than evaluation per se:
“You also have to recognise that
you only get one project. If you get a project and do it well then you
go on to the next one. And then you'll [be] given more opportunity. If
you don't, then you're going to go by the wayside. People are pretty
careful. It happens on a human level almost more than on a numbers
level. The whole process of who gets selected to do what comes out of
people having watched what various people are doing. How they go about
doing it, how they manage themselves, manage others. Numbers are part of
that."
Information technology evaluation
can therefore contribute to the intellectual stimulation that is
associated with transformational leadership and its impact on innovation
and creativity (Bass, 1999, pg. 11). This leads to a different role for
evaluation to that envisaged by transactional leadership. The role of
evaluation is:
“to set the framework: this is how
we reach these decisions; we expect to see this kind of analysis; to
help people think through, or to help my people help other people think
through, how do we tackle particular cases, and so that’s one role which
is as sort of an enabler, a support role for the organisation”.
5. Conclusion
Transactional leadership poses a
challenge for evaluation, which is as yet unresolved. Transactional
leaders set goals, clarify desired outcomes and provide feedback; with
the consequence that evaluation is entrusted with a knowledge-based
role, and is expected to provide a rational basis for prioritising
certain projects over others. Evaluation promises representational
faithfulness; thereby providing a systematic basis for valuing
alternatives. Projects are selected, implemented and any deviations from
plan form a basis for learning and future improvement. The premise is
that, with sufficient effort, outcomes will follow on from expectations
in a deterministic fashion. Evaluation thus takes responsibility for the
consequences of decision-making. This even applies to those elements of
a situation that are difficult to predict; for instance, Doherty et al.
(2003, pg. 51) suggest that, ‘the vast majority of [unanticipated
consequences] could be predicted at some point within the systems
development, with careful and systematic analysis’. Yet, the fundamental
difficulties of expressing even the basic metrics of cost and benefits
remain a hurdle to the realisation of transactional leadership’s aim of
clarifying the world for subordinates.
What happens if the basic premise
of transactional leadership is challenged? What happens if the world
cannot be clarified for subordinates? What happens, in other words, if
evaluation cannot deliver representational faithfulness and rational
decisions? One prospect of this possibility is the imperative to explore
the implications of transformational leadership for the exercise of
evaluation. Evaluation remains important under transformational
leadership, but the way in which evaluation is exercised is changed.
Evaluation is no longer premised on the ability to predict future
outcomes in an uncertain world. Instead, it becomes a means through
which individuals can think through the consequences of their proposals
so as to be better prepared to adapt their projects to contingencies as
they arise. Evaluation ceases to be a way of managing the world, and
becomes a means by which the individual is challenged to think through
consequences in a systematic fashion. Evaluation enables the individual
to take responsibility.
5.1 Acknowledgements
The author acknowledges the funding
provided by the Chartered Institute of Management Accountants in support
of the research reported here.
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